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Diversity v. Colorblindness
Patrick S. Shin
ABSTRACT
There seems to be broad social consensus that racial diversity is
generally a good thing. Disagreements tend to focus on the constraints
we should observe in bringing such diversity about. Evaluating the
justification of such constraints requires understanding the kind of good
that racial diversity is supposed to constitute. In this Article, I draw on
concepts familiar from philosophical discussions in value theory to
analyze the value of racial diversity on the one hand and that of
colorblindness on the other. Using several opinions from Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 11 to
stake out some of the central positions, I argue first that the value of
racial diversity is conditional or extrinsic, not intrinsic, but that we
have both instrumental and non-instrumental reasons to regard it as
something worth caring about. I further argue that the constraint of
colorblindness is, strictly speaking, orthogonal to the value of racial
diversity, because what colorblindness opposes is selecting for diversity,
not diversity itself, but that the two values come into opposition when
such selection is required to bring about diversity. I consider the case for
adhering to the constraint of colorblindness in such circumstances. I
contend that the strongest positive argument for a deontological
conception of colorblindness—viz., that it expresses a constitutional
principle of equal respect—is obsolete. I further suggest that the strongest
negative argument—viz., that selecting for diversity expresses disrespect
for persons—ignores the possibility that such selection measures, when
adopted in response to unjust social conditions, might more plausibly be
regarded as an expression of a commitment to substantive principles of
equality.

 Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School; Ph.D., Harvard
University (Philosophy); J.D., Harvard Law School. Thanks to Eric Blumenson, Mitu Gulati,
Kim Krawiec, Jeff Lipshaw, Andy Perlman, and Gowri Ramachandran for their helpful
comments on drafts of this Article.
1. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following claim:
Other things equal, it is better that a group of people exhibit racial
diversity than that the group not exhibit racial diversity.

Perhaps the assertion will seem uncontroversial, as far as it goes. If a
group can be constituted so that it is racially diverse without making
it worse in any other respect, without any undesired side effects, and
without need for any special selection procedures—i.e., all else being
equal—then why not say that we have reason to prefer that the
group exhibit that property? Given all of those qualifications, even
the skeptic may see little reason to dispute the point. Racial diversity
is generally a good thing. Who would want to deny that?
Then again, maybe all of those qualifications only make the claim
more difficult to fathom. If everything else really is held equal, how
exactly could adding the property of racial diversity make any group
1176
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of people better? If two groups of people are really identical in every
other way, and we hold fixed all other circumstances of social
context, then is it really so clear that the racially diverse group is
necessarily better? Better in what sense? Sure, racial diversity is a
good thing, other things being equal, but its value starts to seem
obscure when we prescind from too many of our actual social
circumstances.
So perhaps we had better reflect a bit more carefully. Let us start
again with the assumption that racial diversity can have positive
value. Now let us ask a few different questions. Does racial diversity
always have value, or does its value depend on the existence of other
conditions? If the latter, what are those conditions? When racial
diversity does have value, what exactly is the nature of that value?
What specific reasons do we have to prefer a group that is racially
diverse to a group that is racially homogeneous? How do those
reasons hold up against other values that we hold important? Perhaps
everyone will agree that, other things equal, racial diversity is a good
thing, but people obviously disagree about the relation of the value
of racial diversity to other things we value. Namely, they disagree
about the nature and strength of the reasons that we have to want
diversity, about whether it conflicts with other values or principles to
which we should also be committed, and about the priority of
principles by which such conflicts should be resolved.
Take, for example, the disagreement among the Justices in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1.2 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer argued that in the
context of public school education, the “interest in achieving racial
‘diversity’ . . . [or] in promoting or preserving greater racial
‘integration’ of public schools”3 is a function of our interest in the
social consequences that such diversity would help bring about, such
as the eradication of remnants of past segregation, the enhancement
of education for all students, and better preparation for democratic
government.4 For Justice Breyer, the obvious importance of those

2. Id. Throughout this Article, I will be using the Justices’ opinions in Parents Involved
to stake out several possible views about the nature of the value of racial diversity versus
colorblindness. I intend my arguments, however, to be about the value of racial diversity in
general and not limited to the particular circumstances of that case or to the context of public
education.
3. Id. at 838 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 843.
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goals left no room to deny the constitutionally compelling value of
racial diversity.5
Chief Justice Roberts, however, was unmoved. He dismissed
Justice Breyer’s conclusions about the value of racial diversity in the
public school context as little more than a non sequitur. In the Chief
Justice’s view, it did not follow from the fact that racial diversity
might have important social benefits that it was constitutionally
permissible for school districts to use race-conscious procedures to
bring such diversity about. As he put it,
Justice Breyer’s position comes down to a familiar claim: The end
justifies the means. . . . Simply because the school districts may seek
a worthy goal does not mean they are free to discriminate on the
basis of race to achieve it, or that their racial classifications should
be subject to less exacting scrutiny.6

For Chief Justice Roberts, even if one were to concede that racial
diversity in the public school setting might help promote “worthy”
ends, that would not justify compromising what he sees as the core
value of the Equal Protection Clause: a deontological commitment
to a principle of colorblindness.7
The disagreement between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Breyer implicates an apparently irreconcilable conflict of values, an
intractable difference of views on what we have most reason to care
about—or at least what the Equal Protection Clause calls upon us to
care about—when it comes to issues of racial diversity. I characterize
the debate in terms of a conflict of values in part to emphasize that it
seems to transcend disagreements about any particular matter of fact,
such as whether or not racial diversity really does contribute to
certain salutary social consequences. This is not to deny that the
debate encompasses various important factual disagreements. Surely,
it does. But whatever the conclusions that social science might
deliver on particular issues in dispute—for example, whether racial
diversity has measurable pedagogical benefits8—the question of the
significance that we should attach to those conclusions is not itself
5. See id. (“If an educational interest that combines these three elements is not
‘compelling,’ what is?”).
6. Id. at 743 (plurality opinion).
7. I discuss in more detail below what I mean by a “deontological commitment.”
8. Compare Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 839 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he evidence
supporting an educational interest in racially integrated schools is well established . . . .”), with
id. at 761–65 (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing skepticism).
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susceptible to empirical determination. The questions of how and
whether the importance of achieving racial diversity relates to the
value of colorblindness (such as it may be) and of how any tension
between them should be arbitrated depend upon normative
judgments about what we should most care about and the principles
to which we should commit ourselves. The task of identifying and
sharpening these questions is the focus of this Article.
After addressing some threshold difficulties in Part II relating to
the definition of “racial diversity,” I devote some time in Part III to
the explication of a set of helpful categories borrowed from
philosophical discussions in the theory of value. I then chart out
possible arguments for the value of racial diversity in each of those
conceptual categories. In Part IV, I discuss the ideal of
colorblindness. My main interest there is to investigate how, if we
assume that racial diversity does indeed have value, the constraint of
colorblindness could possibly be thought to prevent measures
designed to bring it about. In Part V, I summarize several key points
of my analysis and offer some concluding observations.
II. THRESHOLD ISSUES
Several threshold problems need to be addressed. The first is that
not everyone will agree about what the term “racial diversity”
means.9 More specifically, there is likely to be disagreement about
what “diversity” means, what “race” means, and the conditions
under which a particular group can be regarded as racially diverse.
Furthermore, each of these points of possible disagreement seems
more or less independent of the others. Agreement about what
“diversity” with respect to a characteristic means does not imply
agreement about the meaning of “race,” and agreement about the
meanings of “race” and “diversity” does not ensure agreement about
whether any particular group of people can be regarded as racially
diverse.
My intent in this paper is neither to resolve nor to dismiss these
possible disagreements. They are simply not my focus. I will try to
steer clear of them to the extent that it is possible for me to do so.

9. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, What Exactly Is Racial Diversity?, 91 CAL.
L. REV. 1149 (2003) (reviewing ANDREA GUERRERO, SILENCE AT BOALT HALL: THE
DISMANTLING OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (2002) (discussing various difficulties in
understanding the notion)).
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By no means do I wish to brush off the serious difficulties associated
with defining the notion of race,10 nor do I mean to take issue with
critical debunking accounts of the concept.11 I bracket these worries
because I do not think that addressing them is particularly helpful to
understanding the values of racial diversity or of colorblindness. So I
will not use “race” in any technical or specially defined sense, but
rather to refer to that amalgam of characteristics—e.g., skin color,
self-identification, ethnicity, ancestry, country of origin, etc.—that
people ordinarily take into account in making determinations about
an individual’s race.12
As for the term “racial diversity,” a slightly different stipulation is
in order. “Racial diversity” is a context-dependent13 and normatively
loaded14 term. Some might believe, for example, that whether a
particular group can be characterized as racially diverse depends on
how closely the actual racial composition of the group approximates
some ideal benchmark, such as the actual racial distribution of some
broader population,15 or perhaps on whether traditionally
10. See generally LAWRENCE BLUM, “I’M NOT A RACIST, BUT . . .”: THE MORAL
QUANDARY OF RACE (2002); K. Anthony Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood
Connections, in K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE
POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 30, 30–74 (1996).
11. See, e.g., Appiah, supra note 10, at 71–74; Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
12. I do this with the awareness that my usage here could be regarded as objectionably
naïve. See generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 36–40 (1991) (distinguishing three different meanings of “race” in Supreme Court
decisions); Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness”
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, in ROBERT C. POST ET AL.,
PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 112–13
(2001) (discussing Gotanda’s account).
13. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 7–8 (2003) (defining diversity
as a function of differences that “a particular society deems salient” and as dependent on “how
a particular society perceives differences and which of them it considers salient to people’s
status”).
14. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 46 (2003)
(discussing the view that “diversity” is a “code word” for a certain sort of redistributive policy);
SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 8 (“Those who invoke the diversity ideal may hope to associate
themselves with a political mood or constituency, to convey their adherence to the letter and
spirit of pro-diversity laws, to avoid having to defend past conduct, to change the subject, and
so forth.”); Carbado & Gulati, supra note 9, at 1153 (“To opponents of affirmative action,
diversity means quotas and ‘underqualified’ people of color; to supporters, diversity means a
richer learning environment and social progress.”).
15. See LEVINSON, supra note 14, at 24 (hypothesizing, as a “quite common” idea of
diversity in the employment context, “that one’s workforce reflects in some important sense
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underrepresented minority subgroups have a substantial presence
within the group.16 Because my central concern in this Article is an
analysis of the value of racial diversity, I must avoid any usage of the
term that risks begging critical questions about the reasons we have
to pursue it. To that end, I will try to adhere to a primarily
descriptive rather than a prescriptive or normative usage of the
term.17 I shall simply understand racial diversity as a rough measure
of the heterogeneity of a group’s members in respect of racial
phenotype. I will say, on this understanding, that a group in which
all individuals share membership in a single race has an absence of
racial diversity, that a group in which more than one racial subgroup
is present has at least some racial diversity, and that a group in which
many racial subgroups are present and substantially represented has a
higher degree of racial diversity. This is, to be sure, an extremely
vague account, but for my purposes should suffice. What is
important for the present discussion is to be clear that I will be using
“racial diversity” as a descriptive term, rather than as an implicit
reference to some normative ideal for the constituency of any given
group of people.
These stipulations clear the way for a discussion of the value of
racial diversity while avoiding intractable threshold disputes. I do not
believe that the central disagreements about the value of racial
diversity hinge upon differences of view as to the proper conception
of race or as to what specific criteria or measures should be used in
determining whether a particular group is racially diverse. I am not
saying that disagreements about the value of racial diversity never
come down to such conceptual differences of view.18 But people who
agree about the concepts of race and diversity might still disagree
about the value of racial diversity, and people who agree about the
value of racial diversity might not agree about the best way to

the demographic composition of the surrounding society”); SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 164
(criticizing the tendency to think of diversity in terms of “proportional representation”).
16. For a critique of definitions of diversity based on statistical underrepresentation, see
Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of “Diversity,” WIS.
L. REV. 105, 131–46 (1993) (discussing the difficulties of constructing a meaningful notion of
diversity consistent with a commitment to substantive equality).
17. See SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 20 (distinguishing between descriptive and
normative diversity).
18. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 14, at 15–16 (voicing concern that disagreements
about the significance of diversity may in many cases stem from disagreement about what it
really means).
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conceive of race and diversity. The clash between Justice Breyer and
Chief Justice Roberts, for example, surely does not reduce to a
theoretical disagreement about the concept of race or about what
constitutes true racial diversity. Resolving whatever disagreements
they might have on those matters would not settle their basic
dispute. Agreement on a definition of racial diversity would only
sharpen the issue that separates them. Is racial diversity something
worth caring about? And even if it is, is it the sort of value that could
justify using race-conscious procedures to produce it? It is to those
issues that I now turn.
III. THE VALUE OF DIVERSITY
A. Categories of Value
On one modern philosophical approach to value, we can say that
a thing is valuable when it gives us reason to hold certain favorable
attitudes or to take certain favorable actions with respect to it.19 But
not everything that is valuable provides the same sorts of reasons for
action or calls forth the same sorts of attitudes. We might agree that
both a stock certificate and a finger painting given to us by a child
are things of value, but the way in which we value the former is
different from the way in which we value the latter. A pair of familiar
distinctions allows us to differentiate among the various ways in
which things have value or in which we value things. One is the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value, and the other is the
distinction between valuing something instrumentally and valuing
something as an end.20 Understanding these distinctions will help us
sort out just what someone might be claiming when making an
assertion that racial diversity is (or is not) valuable or good.
19. T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 95 (1998). On Scanlon’s theory
of value, which he calls a “buck-passing” account, a thing’s goodness or value is not itself a
reason-giving property that the thing possesses. Id. at 95–98. Rather, for a thing to be valuable
is simply for the thing to have other properties that provide and constitute reasons to respond
to it in certain ways. See id. at 97. I am in general agreement with Scanlon’s account, but the
discussion of this paper should not depend on any particular theory of value. For recent
discussions of the buck-passing account of value, see, for example, Roger Crisp, Goodness and
Reasons: Accentuating the Negative, 117 MIND 257 (2008); Jonas Olson, Buck-Passing and the
Wrong Kind of Reasons, 54 PHIL. Q. 295 (2004); and Pekka Väyrynen, Resisting the BuckPassing Account of Value, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN METAETHICS 295, 295–324 (Russ ShaferLandau ed., 2006).
20. See generally Rae Langton, Objective and Unconditioned Value, 116 PHIL. REV. 157
(2007).
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The intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is usually understood as having
to do with the source of a thing’s value, or more precisely, the extent
to which a thing’s value depends on its relation to other things.
Something is intrinsically valuable if it is valuable simply in itself,21
regardless of its relation to anything else that might be valuable.22 To
say that something has intrinsic value is to say that its value or
goodness does not depend on external conditions and so is in that
sense unconditionally good,23 or that we always have reason to want
it to exist.24 In contrast, something is extrinsically valuable if its value
depends on conditions external to it, such as the condition of being
causally related to a particular consequence, or the condition of
being regarded as valuable by a particular person.25
The distinction between instrumental value and value as an end
has to do with whether the value of a thing depends upon its
usefulness in bringing about, or its potential to give rise to, desirable
states of affairs. We regard a thing’s value as purely instrumental if we
value it entirely for its potential to bring about such consequences.26
We regard its value as non-instrumental if we value it for its own
sake, as an end in itself, or for reasons other than considerations
relating to its usefulness in bringing about any particular set of
21. See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, Two Distinctions in Goodness, in CREATING THE
KINGDOM OF ENDS 249, 250–51 (1996).
22. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 2–3, 19 (1993).
23. KORSGAARD, supra note 21, at 257–58 (interpreting Kant).
24. G.E. Moore famously suggested that a thing could be thought to have intrinsic
value if we would consider it worthwhile for the thing to exist “even if there were absolutely
nothing else in the Universe besides.” G.E. MOORE, ETHICS 68 (1912) [hereinafter MOORE,
ETHICS]; see also G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 187 (1903); NOAH M. LEMOS, INTRINSIC
VALUE: CONCEPT AND WARRANT 10–11 (1994). Of course, on this definition of intrinsic
value, one might well believe that nothing has intrinsic value (although Moore himself
assumed this was not possible, G. E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA, supra, § 17 ¶ 2) or that only
some very limited classes of things do, such as rational beings. Immanuel Kant famously argued
that the only thing that was unconditionally good was a “good will,” i.e., the motive of acting
in accordance with duty. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 7 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785); KORSGAARD,
supra note 211, at 257. These ontological questions about value are not particularly germane
to my discussion here. What is important for my purposes is that one can value a thing for its
own sake (i.e., non-instrumentally) without being committed to any belief that the thing has
intrinsic value in the Moorean sense. It is also possible to regard something as instrumentally
valuable even while also believing that it has intrinsic value, as I suggest below.
25. See ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 19; KORSGAARD, supra note 21, at 257–58.
26. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE PRACTICE OF VALUE 15–16 (2003) (“Things are of mere
instrumental value when their value is entirely due to the value of what they bring about, or to
the value of what they are likely to bring about or may be used to bring about.”).
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further consequences or results.27 According to one influential
account, the intrinsic-extrinsic and instrumental-end distinctions are
best regarded as orthogonal.28 A slightly different recent account
suggests that we think of instrumental value simply as one species of
extrinsic value.29 The precise relation between the two sets of
distinctions, however, is not critical for my own purposes here. What
is important is to note the two sets of questions that can be asked
about a thing’s value. First, is it valuable unconditionally, in and of
itself? And second, whether it is valuable in and of itself, do we value
it as an end (for its own sake), for its usefulness in bringing about
certain results, or for other reasons? I take the first question as
relating to the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction and the second as
relating to the instrumental-end distinction.
Returning to our examples, we might say that the value of the
stock certificate is extrinsic and wholly instrumental. Its value is
extrinsic in that it depends and is conditional on the significance it is
given by the rules of various financial and legal institutions.30 We can
also say that the stock certificate is instrumentally valuable insofar as
we value it merely as a means of securing, or as a representation of,

27. Langton, supra note 20, at 162–64.
28. Christine Korsgaard argues that the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction bears on the way in
which a thing can have value, whereas the instrumental-end distinction bears on the way in
which we value a thing. See KORSGAARD, supra note 21, at 250, 257; Langton, supra note 20,
at 160 (discussing Korsgaard’s view).
29. See Langton, supra note 20, at 163–64. Langton’s account is an elaboration and
modification of Korsgaard’s view. Langton argues that Korsgaard’s approach may be too
limiting. According to Langton’s alternative approach, the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction can
apply both to the way in which a thing can have value and to the way in which we value things.
For Langton, to value something intrinsically is to value it for its own sake, and to value
something extrinsically is simply to value it for the sake of something else. She suggests that we
think of valuing something instrumentally as a specific way of valuing it for the sake of
something else, i.e., as a subspecies of valuing something extrinsically. Furthermore, according
to Langton’s proposal, while a thing can have either intrinsic or extrinsic value, she suggests
that we think of a thing as extrinsically valuable if it gets its value from another source, and that
instrumental value be regarded as one specific type of extrinsic value. See id. There are, of
course, many other ways in which philosophers have tried to explicate the notion of intrinsic
value and the distinctions among the ways in which things can have value or be valued. See,
e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 2–3, 19; RAZ, supra note 26; Warren S. Quinn, Theories of
Intrinsic Value, 11 AM. PHIL. Q. 123 (1974); Judith Thomson, On Some Ways in Which a
Thing Can Be Good, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 96 (1992).
30. Cf. KORSGAARD, supra note 21, at 257–58 (equating extrinsic value with
conditional value).
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other things that we value.31 Similar examples might include things
like tools, paints, medicines, maps, and so on.
Not all extrinsically valuable things, however, need be regarded
as having purely instrumental value. In other words, the value of
some things can be conditional or dependent on their particular
contexts, yet not consist in their usefulness in bringing about any
further results or consequences. We might think of the value of the
child’s finger painting, for example, as entirely extrinsic yet noninstrumental. Our reasons for regarding the finger painting as
something good or valuable have nothing to do with its usefulness as
a means to any further end, so we do not regard its value as
instrumental. But we would not think of the object as having any
value in and of itself. Objectively speaking, it is perhaps nothing
more than a haphazard smear of random colors. The finger
painting’s value depends on conditions external to it, such as the fact
that it was given to us by a child as an expression of her affection for
us. The value of the finger painting is in that sense extrinsic yet noninstrumental.
We think of the child herself, of course, as being both noninstrumentally and intrinsically valuable. The child’s value does not
depend on her usefulness, and we would also say that her value, like
the value of any person, is not conditioned on anyone’s actual
attitudes or actions with respect to her. She is valuable and worthy of
moral respect by virtue of being a person or her status as a
(developing) rational agent. Some might argue that certain natural
phenomena—think of the Grand Canyon or perhaps an unspoiled
rainforest—are also both non-instrumentally and intrinsically
valuable, insofar as our esteem for those things has nothing to do
with what they can be used to produce, and insofar as they could be
thought valuable even if no one actually cared about them.32 We can
say of such things that they are valuable and good just by virtue of
the sorts of things they are, and that we value them for their own
sakes or as ends in themselves.
The categories of instrumental and intrinsic value are in a limited
sense mutually exclusive, in that it would be contradictory to say that
something was both intrinsically valuable and that its value was
31. As Rae Langton points out, however, a misguided miser might value the stock
certificate as though its value was non-instrumental and intrinsic. Langton, supra note 20, at
165.
32. See MOORE, ETHICS, supra note 24, at 68.
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merely instrumental. If we regard something as intrinsically valuable,
then we necessarily also believe that its good derives at least in part
from something besides the consequences it can effect. But it does
not follow that intrinsically valuable things can only be valued for
their own sakes.33 It is certainly possible to regard as instrumentally
valuable something that holds intrinsic value. If, for example, our
child’s finger paintings unexpectedly become objects of critical
acclaim and popular fancy, an unscrupulous art broker might come
to regard the child as a mere instrument to further his own financial
ends. Similarly, an industrialist who regarded the unspoiled rainforest
as a source of lumber might similarly be described as treating as
instrumentally valuable something that is good in itself. We might
say that the art broker and the industrialist are in some sense making
mistaken and morally objectionable judgments about the value of the
objects of their interest. Perhaps we might even say, more generally,
that bearers of intrinsic value ought not be valued as mere
instruments. But it seems nevertheless true that it is possible for
people to regard as instrumentally valuable things that could (and
perhaps should) be valued for their own sakes.
By the same token, it seems possible to value for its own sake
something that we might think ought to be regarded as merely
having instrumental value. A miserly billionaire, for example, might
regard the continued accumulation of his personal wealth as good in
and of itself,34 rather than as a means for securing goods or services
for himself or others. Whereas regarding intrinsically valuable things
as mere instruments (as do the art broker and industrialist above) can
be morally objectionable, the sort of misvaluing that the miser is
guilty of seems not so much immoral as it does misguided, irrational,
or fetishistic.35 Our beliefs about the nature of a thing’s value — i.e.,
whether it is intrinsic or extrinsic—thus influence our judgments
about the way in which we ought to value the thing —i.e., whether
as a means to further ends or for its own sake.
Clarity about the nature of a thing’s value and how we ought to
value it is important to evaluating claims about the extent to which

33. For a very insightful discussion on this point, see Langton, supra note 20, at 162–
65.
34. See id. at 165.
35. Of course, we might also criticize the miser on moral grounds if his fetishistic
attitude toward money was causing him to be uncharitable or otherwise neglectful of duties he
owes to others.

1186

DO NOT DELETE

1175

11/19/2009 7:09 PM

Diversity v. Colorblindness

that thing is worth promoting, protecting, or otherwise caring
about. For example, suppose that you come across a stack of your
child’s finger paintings as you are cleaning out your office. I walk by
and see you wistfully admiring them. I coldly argue that the
paintings are not worth preserving because they are nothing but
random splotches of ugly colors on cheap paper that serve no useful
function and have no monetary worth. How will you respond?
Surely, you will not be moved by my argument. Why not? It is
because my argument is nothing more than an assertion that the
finger paintings have neither instrumental value nor intrinsic
significance. But, of course, your reasons for caring about the finger
paintings have nothing to do with those considerations. You might
agree that they are not valuable either as useful instruments or in
virtue of their intrinsic merits, but you value them nonetheless.36 You
do not necessarily believe that the paintings have any value or worth
in and of themselves. They are valuable because they arise out of
your relationship with your child. You care about the finger
paintings not for their own sakes, but for the sake of that
relationship. Their value is extrinsic yet you do not value them in a
purely instrumental way. My blindness to this possibility was my
mistake in dismissing your interest in the finger paintings.
B. Racial Diversity as Conditionally and Extrinsically Valuable
Let us venture into more controversial waters. Finger paintings
are one thing; the problem of specifying the value of racial diversity
is another. What can we say about the value of racial diversity?
Diversity is a property of a group of individuals.37 Of course,
particular individuals can contribute or detract from a group’s racial
diversity, but it is the group, not its members individually, that bears
the property of diversity. We can start, then, by asking whether racial
diversity is an intrinsically or extrinsically valuable property for a
group of people.
I stated above that to say that a thing is intrinsically valuable
means that its goodness does not depend on external conditions.
Thus, to say that a particular property is intrinsically valuable is to say
36. Here is a case in which Langton might say that you simply value the finger paintings
extrinsically. See Langton, supra note 20, at 163.
37. Groups can of course be composed of subgroups, and so one might also talk about
intergroup diversity, see SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 20–21, but I am concerned here with
diversity within groups composed by individual persons.
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that it is unconditionally good that something be characterized by it,
or that we always have reason to want that property to be present. If
racial diversity has intrinsic value, therefore, we should always have
reason to want a group of people to have this property, whatever the
circumstances. This does not seem altogether plausible.
Under some conditions, it would seem at best a matter of
indifference whether a group possessed racial diversity. Suppose a
band of violent criminals walks into a bank and takes everyone inside
hostage. Is it necessarily a good thing that the hostage group be
racially diverse as opposed to homogeneous? If the band of criminals
happens to be all white, would we be inclined to say that it would be
better if that group were more racially diverse?
These questions are of course absurd. We have no reason to care
about the hostage or criminal group’s racial composition, much less
to prefer that either group reflect any sort of diversity. The hostages
are a group of people suffering various wrongs at the hands of their
captors. If the racially homogeneous composition of the hostage
group were the result of some non-random circumstance (e.g., the
criminals’ racist motives), we might have reason to regret the
existence of that circumstance or resent those responsible for it. At
most, however, this would show that there are some conditions
under which we might have reason to be concerned about the
group’s racial composition. It does not show that it would be
intrinsically better that the group be racially diverse. Assuming that
the composition of that group of people is a matter of pure
happenstance, I do not see how one could say that it would be better
for that group, better for anyone else, or better from some agentneutral perspective that the group be racially diverse. The same
seems true of the criminal group. The perpetrators are engaging in
legally and morally impermissible conduct, and the group’s racial
composition seems (prima facie) immaterial to any judgment about
the goodness, badness, or moral character of that group. There is no
reason to think that the presence of racial diversity among this group
of criminals would be in itself a good or bad thing.
This simple thought experiment shows, I believe, that the good
of racial diversity is not intrinsic or unconditional.38 We cannot say

38. George Sher asserts that in debates about diversity, “the appeal to intrinsic value is
essentially a nonargument.” George Sher, Diversity, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 85, 97 (1999). His
assertion comes in the context of a broader contention that all arguments in favor of diversity-
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that it is valuable, in and of itself, whenever and wherever it appears,
nor that we always have reason to promote it or bring it about. The
value of racial diversity is therefore extrinsic, in that it depends upon
the particular conditions and circumstances in which it is present.
One might object here that my hostage scenario distorts our
thinking about the value of diversity and cannot support any general
claims about the nature of that value, because the two groups of
people I identified in that case—the hostages and the criminals—are
not groups that are worth caring about in the first place. One might
argue, in other words, that no one cares about the racial diversity of
hostages and criminal enterprises because those groups are
themselves devoid of value. Perhaps racial diversity is always a good
thing in groups or communities that have institutional value or at
least legitimacy.39
It is not obvious to me that this is in fact the case.40 But even
assuming this qualified statement to be true, the very need for the
qualification only proves my point. The value of the property of
racial diversity is conditional: it depends on the context in which it
arises. It is perhaps a good thing given certain conditions but
perhaps not others; or perhaps it is good for some groups and
irrelevant to others. Perhaps the good of racial diversity depends on
certain basic features of the group that possesses or lacks it; or
perhaps it depends on various conditions characterizing society at
large. In any event, the value of racial diversity appears to be
conditional and hence extrinsic, rather than intrinsic in the sense of
being good in and of itself.
To say that racial diversity is not intrinsically and unconditionally
valuable does not diminish its significance. It only establishes that its
value is contingent on the conditions under which it obtains. The
examples I have suggested show, for example, that whether there is
any reason to care about a group’s racial diversity may depend at
least in part on the nature of the group itself, including its purposes
and the circumstances of its formation. While this conclusion should
based affirmative action rely on backward-looking attempts to rectify past injustices, see id. at
103, a conclusion that I do not endorse.
39. Cf. SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 57 (discussing institutional structures, such as
markets, that value diversity).
40. Suppose a group of people join together to make an anonymous donation to
support relief efforts following a natural disaster that devastates some urban community. All
else being equal, would we say that it would be preferable that this group of anonymous
donors be racially diverse? It does not seem to me that it should matter.
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be at some level perfectly obvious, it flushes out an important
implication. Because racial diversity is not an intrinsic good, the mere
fact that some action will increase a group’s racial diversity does not
necessarily count as a consideration in favor of taking that action.
There is nothing about racial diversity in itself that explains why and
under what conditions it is worth caring about. This is what it means
to say that the value of racial diversity is extrinsic. Any explanation of
that value must provide an account of the circumstances that make it
the case that racial diversity can be regarded as having value.
C. Conditions on the Value of Racial Diversity
Let me begin an effort towards such an explanation by making
some general observations about the types of settings in which the
racial diversity of a population seems to be relevant. Generalizing
from some of the examples discussed above, the racial diversity of a
group seems irrelevant—neither good nor bad—in cases where the
group does not constitute a socially legitimate community or
association. On the other side of that coin, it seems that we do tend
to regard racial diversity as a good thing in various contexts that
touch on the basic institutional organization of our society.41 These
contexts include employment, education, and governance. To be
clear, I assert that it seems desirable that the groups of people
operating in these settings be characterized by racial diversity rather
than by racial homogeneity. This seems true whether or not we
would be justified in attempting to bring about racial diversity in
these contexts through any particular means. Whatever one’s views
on the latter score, I take it to be uncontroversial that the presence
of racial diversity in the groups that populate these settings is
generally a good thing, something to be glad for when it is present
and something to be worried about when it is not. Much the same
can be said with respect to the areas of life that give structure to our
social interactions, such as residential and interest-based
communities. It seems good that those interactions take place in the
presence of racial diversity, and it seems bad, although not without

41. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, Racial Integration as a Compelling Interest, 21
CONST. COMMENT. 15 (2004).
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exception, when our social interactions are limited to racially
homogeneous groups.42
Thus, putting aside for the moment the controversial question of
whether and how we should actively try to bring about racial
diversity in any of these various contexts, it seems we can say at least
that it would be in general a good thing for racial diversity to
characterize the various domains and sub-domains of public and
private employment, educational institutions, local and national
politics, interest-based organizations of all sorts, and residential
communities. We might also plausibly conjecture that the value of
racial diversity in these contexts derives from their centrality to the
proper functioning of our economic, political, and social institutions,
and the just distribution of economic goods and opportunities. We
care about racial diversity, in other words, not for its own sake, but
for the sake of the value we place on the well-functioning of our
social institutions and our democratic way of life in general.
These observations broadly suggest some of the contexts in
which we tend to care about racial diversity. True as they might be,
they do not address the reasons we might have to do so. Granted
that our concern for racial diversity derives from our concern for, say,
the value we place on certain forms of social interaction, the hard
question is why our valuing the latter should be thought to provide
grounds for caring about the former. Given that we care about racial
diversity for the sake of broader social concerns, how exactly does
the one concern follow from the other?
D. The Instrumental Value of Racial Diversity
1. Group and social benefits
Here, it becomes helpful to ask whether the value of racial
diversity—given our conclusion that it is extrinsic rather than
intrinsic—is instrumental or non-instrumental. Let us consider both
possibilities. One familiar argument in favor of promoting racial
diversity in various contexts is that it has good consequences for all
members of the group in which such diversity is present, such as
improved learning outcomes or beneficial socialization effects in the
42. I say this advisedly. Surely, there are particular cultural contexts in which
homogeneity is not bad. We might imagine, for example, a group of rabbis engaged in prayer,
or more intimate groups defined by familial relations. I discuss this point in a bit more depth
below. See infra Part III.E.
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educational context,43 productivity benefits44 in the workplace,45 or
better46 outcomes in various decision-making contexts.47 Thus, racial
diversity is not valuable for its own sake, but is instrumentally
valuable as a means of bringing about further consequences that
directly benefit groups that have it.48
A related but distinct argument is that racial diversity in certain
contexts is instrumentally valuable not only because of its immediate
effects for the groups or particular institutions that have it, but
because of its longer-term potential to produce benefits for society as

43. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 843
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
44. For a recent, extended argument concerning such benefits (though not focused on
racial diversity specifically), see SCOTT PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF
DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 319–20 (2007).
45. There is a wealth of established and ongoing empirical research studying the effects
of diversity in corporate organizations, teams, and workgroups. See Karen A. Jehn et al., Why
Differences Make a Difference: A Field Study of Diversity, Conflict, and Performance in
Workgroups, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 741 (1999); Elizabeth Mannix & Margaret Neale, What
Differences Make a Difference? The Promise and Reality of Diverse Teams in Organizations, 6
PSYCHOL. SCI. IN THE PUB. INT. 31 (2005), as reprinted in SCI. AM., Aug. 2006, at 32
(abridged); David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for
Managing Diversity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 79; David B. Wilkins, From
“Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based
Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1571–
89 (2004); Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A. O’Reilly III, Demography and Diversity in
Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research, 20 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 77
(1998); Eric S. Nguyen & Douglas Brayley, Good Business: A Market-Based Argument for Law
Firm Diversity 7–9 (Working Paper, May 21, 2008) (citing numerous studies), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1124224.
46. Relevant senses of “better” might include fairer, more accurate, and more
empathetic.
47. An example might be the claim that a racially diverse court is better because it would
be likely to produce fairer, more enlightened, or more empathetic decisions than a non-diverse
court. Similar claims about the decision-making abilities of diverse as compared to non-diverse
groups might be made for other contexts as well. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial
Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury
Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 608–10 (2006); John M. Conley et
al., Narratives of Diversity in the Corporate Boardroom: What Corporate Insiders Say About Why
Diversity Matters 9–24 (Univ. of N.C. Legal Stud., Working Paper, Paper No. 1415803,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415803.
48. This idea is nicely captured by one formulation of a basic research hypothesis for
social scientists studying the benefits of diversity: “Identity diverse groups perform better than
homogeneous groups.” PAGE, supra note 44, at 319. The posited value of diversity here is that
it enhances group performance, which is in turn valuable insofar as that enhanced performance
will help the group bring about its goals. (Diversity of “identity” is not necessarily the same as
racial diversity, but the point is still the same.)
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a whole.49 One especially familiar instantiation of this argument is
that it is good for elite educational institutions to promote racial
diversity among their student bodies50 because these institutions
provide a path to future leadership positions both in private industry
and in government.51 By enrolling significant numbers of minority
students, these institutions can “seed” the upper echelons of private
industry and government with traditionally underrepresented racial
groups, with a view to ameliorating race-based economic inequalities
and providing role models to encourage future generations of
disadvantaged minorities to pursue similar success.52 Another similar
argument is that exposure to and participation in racially diverse
groups tends to enhance attitudes of tolerance53 and reduce racial
bias among all members of those groups,54 which in the long run
would tend to reduce discrimination, promote healthy social
relations among all citizens, and lead to a more just society.55
The argument that racial diversity may have instrumental value
does not entail any claim that racial diversity is intrinsically good,56

49. See David Orentlicher, Diversity: A Fundamental American Principle, 70 MO. L.
REV. 777, 782–87, 795–803 (2005) (arguing for the beneficial consequences of diversity in
education and employment).
50. See generally WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER:
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS (1998); Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1610 (2003) (arguing that the promotion of racial diversity can be justified as
a means of improving the conditions of society).
51. “[T]he path to leadership must be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals
of every race and ethnicity.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (O’Connor, J.).
52. This is essentially the argument advanced by Justice O’Connor in her Grutter
opinion. See id. at 332–33.
53. LEVINSON, supra note 14, at 95 (discussing the “civic-toleration” argument for
diversity (citing BOWEN & BOK, supra note 50, at 228)).
54. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1066–67, 1109–10 (2006)
(proposing the use of certain special circumstances of racial diversity as a way to reduce racial
bias); Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 1, 24 (2000) (noting a broad range of research finding that “intergroup contact ‘will
reduce prejudice’” given certain other limiting conditions) (quoting H.D. FORBES, ETHNIC
CONFLICT: COMMERCE, CULTURE, AND THE CONTACT HYPOTHESIS 115 (1997)).
55. Racial diversity might help effect justice in more localized institutional contexts as
well. Consider, for example, recent research suggesting that racial diversity in the composition
of juries might increase the quality of their deliberations and the soundness of their verdicts.
See Sommers, supra note 47, at 608–10.
56. Nor does it imply that racial homogeneity is intrinsically bad.
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that it is itself valuable as an end,57 or even that it is immediately
beneficial for the particular group in which it is present. Instead, it
assumes the existence of certain conditions, such as economic
inequalities that disproportionately disadvantage certain racial
minority groups, and that we (as a society) have reason to take action
to correct those inequalities or other circumstances of injustice.58
The “seeding” and role-model arguments in favor of cultivating
racial diversity amount to no more—and no less—than an assertion
that creating such diversity in certain locales provides a means to that
end. On this sort of view, the value of racial diversity lies in its
usefulness as a tool in realizing certain states of affairs in the future.59
Moreover, on this view, what we ultimately care about is bringing
about those future states of affairs, rather than about racial diversity
in itself.60
An obvious and important implication of staking the value of
racial diversity on its potential for producing beneficial consequences
or making a causal contribution to some future state of affairs is that
the value of diversity becomes dependent upon a set of hypotheses
that are subject to empirical verification or challenge.61 On the
instrumentalist view of racial diversity, whether or not racial diversity
truly is worth caring about depends on whether achieving it in a
particular context does in fact produce or contribute to its claimed
beneficial consequences. If the value of racial diversity consists
exclusively in its instrumental efficacy, then successful challenges to
that efficacy62 will also, as a matter of logic, disprove its value.63
57. Recall that it is possible for the value of a thing to be extrinsic yet non-instrumental.
The finger painting given to you by a child (discussed above) is a possible example.
58. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 50; Orentlicher, supra note 49.
59. See Greenberg, supra note 50, at 1618 (“What I find more interesting than the
diversity argument [as justification for affirmative action] is its further justification of
affirmative action for what it does for society as a whole . . . . ‘[T]he whole “nation’s future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure” to the ideas and mores of students as
diverse as this Nation of many peoples.’” (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 313 (1978))).
60. See id.; Orentlicher, supra note 49.
61. And of course, the testing of these hypotheses is a current focus of ongoing social
science research. See, for example, the various studies cited at supra notes 44–48 and infra
note 62.
62. Examples of such challenges include studies questioning whether racial diversity in
the classroom really does produce better educational outcomes, whether diversity in the
workplace really does contribute to greater productivity, and whether racial diversity in
residential settings really does improve inter-racial relations. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 760–66 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)
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Along these same lines, another implication of pinning the value
of racial diversity to its beneficial effects is that if one could show an
equally effective method of producing those same consequences
without cultivating racial diversity, we should have no particular
reason to prefer the promotion of racial diversity over those other
equally effective means. Rather, the choice between those two means
of producing the desired consequences should be a matter of
indifference.64 We could still say that racial diversity had value, but
that value would simply be identical to the value of the other means
of arriving at the same results. This conclusion again falls out directly
from the assumption that the value of racial diversity consists wholly
in its instrumental value.
2. The evidential value of diversity as a “signal”
Although the view of the value of racial diversity as a means of
effecting desirable social consequences is perhaps the most prevalent
instrumentalist view,65 it is not the only possible one. A somewhat
more nuanced view involves regarding the value of racial diversity as
consisting in the information it provides about the group that has it.
We may value racial diversity, in other words, for what it “signals”
about such groups.66 On this view, we may think of racial diversity as
(citing studies and expressing skepticism about pedagogical benefits of diversity); Lisa Hope
Pelled et al., Exploring the Black Box: An Analysis of Work Group Diversity, Conflict, and
Performance, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 20–24 (1999) (reporting some counterproductive effects
of racial diversity in the workplace); Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and
Community in the Twenty-first Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 137–38 (2007)
(arguing that increases in ethnic diversity appears to be correlated with increased social
isolation in the short run).
63. As Peter Schuck puts the point, someone who sees the value of diversity in its
potentially beneficial consequences should be “agnostic about diversity.” SCHUCK, supra note
133, at 66.
64. If that conclusion seems implausible, that might indicate the pull of noninstrumental considerations in favor of racial diversity, to which I turn below.
65. Cf. Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action:
Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 677 (2004) (noting
that current legal justifications of affirmative action have shifted away from remedial rationales
and toward instrumental justifications based on the benefits of the diversity thereby produced).
66. The term “signal” has a rich, somewhat technical signification and usage in certain
areas of social science research. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 24–26
(2000). An adequate treatment of signaling theory is far beyond my scope here. For an
excellent and concise summary of the basics, see Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431,
446–50 (2008); see also Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the
Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998).
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good just because of the value we place on other attributes that are
connected to such diversity.
For example, we might think of racial diversity as good for a
group of people in the same way that a physiological indicator of
health, such as achieving good results on an exercise stress test,
might be regarded as good for a person.67 Passing a physical stress
test is not valuable for its own sake, but neither would it be quite
right to say that it is valuable for what it can be used to bring about.
It is a good thing for a person to be able to pass a stress test because
it evidences good health. It is a proxy for something good, but not
something that we value for its usefulness in bringing about desirable
effects.68 Similar observations could be made about a newborn baby’s
cry or a dog’s wet nose. Neither the infant’s wailing nor the moisture
on the pet’s nose is good for its own sake, nor for any particular
effects they produce. Rather, we think that it is good for a dog’s
nose to be wet and for the newborn to cry because those things are
indicators of wellness and proper functioning. Along these lines, one
might say that it is good for a group to exhibit racial diversity,
because the fact of diversity indicates that the group is in some
respects socially healthy, e.g., that it does not engage in exclusionary
discrimination and perhaps that it is committed to a certain
progressive ideal of equality. The existence of racial diversity provides
us with valuable information about the group that has it. We might
call this an evidential account of the value of diversity.
If racial diversity can be valuable for the information it provides,
what exactly is that information? The answer will depend greatly on
the broader circumstances of the group. For example, the existence
of racial diversity in a random group of people on a subway train
might signal nothing of particular interest, normatively speaking.69
This seems consistent with what I think most people would say in
this context—namely, that we have little if any reason to care
whether the group exhibits diversity or not. On the other hand, the
existence of racial diversity in the partnership ranks of a large law

67. See Recovery Information Fine-Tunes Stress Test Results, HARV. HEART LETTER,
June 2003, at 1–2.
68. Id.
69. This is not to deny that the presence (or absence) of diversity on the train might
provide a basis for various factual inferences, such as demographical information about
locations along its route.
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firm might allow us to draw more significant inferences,70 and one
might say on the basis of such inferences that it would be a good
thing for racial diversity to exist in that kind of group. On the
evidential theory of racial diversity as signal, this is because the
existence of diversity in that context probably does not happen by
accident and therefore says something of interest about the firm’s
values, commitments, and priorities—perhaps, for example, that
members of the firm share an ethos of equality or justice. If we are in
favor of such values and commitments, then we will be inclined to
believe that the presence of racial diversity is, quite literally, a good
sign. And one can believe that racial diversity is a good sign in this
sense without also believing that it is valuable for its own sake or that
its value depends on its ability to produce beneficial effects.
So does the evidential theory of racial diversity’s value amount to
an instrumental view of racial diversity or a non-instrumental view? I
think that the view is somewhat difficult to categorize. One might
argue that the evidential view actually implies that racial diversity
itself has no value, and that what really bears value, if anything, is
whatever state of affairs—e.g., adherence to practices of
nondiscrimination or underlying conditions of justice—that the
condition of diversity is supposed to evidence. So, in the law firm
example, we might be able to make certain kinds of inferences about
the firm based on its level of diversity, but the only thing we would
really have reason to care about is whatever set of circumstances gives
rise to that diversity, not about the fact of diversity itself.
At the same time, it also seems true that racial diversity regarded
as a signal could be regarded as valuable in virtue of its usefulness.
The signal of racial diversity could be instrumentally valuable in the
same sense that any kind of information can be useful in the service
of further ends. The dog’s wet nose is useful to the veterinarian in
making an assessment of the dog’s health. In the same way, the
existence of racial diversity in a particular group or community might
be useful to a governing body in determining whether particular
policies or programs are working fairly, equitably, or otherwise as
they should be. And to outsiders who might be considering joining
the membership of a group, the presence or absence of racial
diversity might be useful in understanding certain values and
70. See Laura Nyantung Beny, Diversity Among Elite American Law Firms: A Signal of
Quality and Prestige 24–29 (Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
777504.
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commitments of the group that might not otherwise be
ascertainable.
It might be thought that the evidential view of racial diversity is
logically inconsistent with any view that would favor the creation of
racial diversity as a means of effecting justice: if the dog’s wet nose
and the newborn’s cry are really just signals of good health, we
would be foolish to splash water on a dog’s nose or make the baby
cry in order to bring about a condition of health. But we must be
careful here. Even if one were to regard racial diversity as
epiphenomenal in some sense with respect to basic conditions of
justice, it would not necessarily be foolish to aim at diversity for the
sake of bringing about the conditions that it is supposed to signal.
Bringing about racial diversity is obviously very different from
squirting water on a dog’s nose: in many contexts, it cannot be
accomplished without significant institutional resolve and deep
commitment. This is precisely what makes racial diversity valuable as
a signal. If it were easy and costless to produce, its evidential value
would be very low.71 It seems plausible, therefore, that the process of
creating diversity might itself effect deep social consequences.
Indeed, it might even be the case that the kind of commitments that
are required to create racial diversity in certain contexts also tend to
effectuate other more basic conditions of justice. If that were true,
then not only would one expect racial diversity to have an evidential
relation to those basic conditions, but it might nevertheless make
sense to aim at racial diversity for the sake of bringing about those
conditions, particularly if targeting the former turned out to be
easier or more practicable than the latter. In that sort of scenario, it
might make sense to aim at racial diversity as a sort of surrogate for
the conditions of justice that it tends to signal.
A final way in which racial diversity as a signal might be regarded
as instrumentally valuable is as a means of communicating certain
information about a group to outside observers.72 Suppose, for
example, that racial diversity is a reliable signal of a commitment to
an ethos of equality and justice. If so, then a group might regard the
attainment of diversity as an effective way of communicating to
outsiders that it shares that ethos. Racial diversity might, from this

71. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 66, at 449.
72. Cf. Wilkins, supra note 45, at 1591–95 (identifying some incentives law firms might
have to advertise their diversity).
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perspective, be like an advertisement of the group’s commitment to
certain norms,73 or even of its prestige,74 and its value might then lie
in its usefulness as a means of inducing others to form certain beliefs
about the group.75
E. Non-Instrumental Ways of Valuing Racial Diversity
So far, I have been considering several ways in which racial
diversity could be thought instrumentally valuable, or useful in the
service of further ends. Are there any non-instrumentalist (yet
extrinsic) accounts? Are there arguments for regarding the racial
diversity of a group as having positive value that does not depend on
its usefulness or its desirable effects?
I suggest two arguments for the goodness of racial diversity that
do not derive from the value of its effects. First, one might argue
that racial diversity is good for particular groups and communities
that have it, even apart from any further consequences that diversity
might facilitate, in the same way that, say, developing a variety of
talents might be thought good for an individual person. Consider
what we (if we were in a certain Aristotelian frame of mind) might
say in the case of the individual. We might say that it is a worthwhile
goal for a person to develop her talents, whether or not this is
instrumentally useful to him or anyone else, simply because trying to
achieve one’s full potential is part of what constitutes human
flourishing and hence is part of what defines the notion of good for
human beings.76 It is worth pursuing for its own sake if one cares at

73. Id.
74. See G. Mitu Gulati & David B. Wilkins, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 599–601 (1996) (explaining
how the existence of racial diversity might be regarded as a sign of excellence or prestige in the
law firm context).
75. There is, of course, the possibility of false signals, i.e., the possibility that a group
might manufacture a certain level of racial diversity to make it appear that it is committed to a
certain vision of equality, when in fact it is not. But, as noted above, creating racial diversity in
the contexts we care about it most tends to be costly and requires a great deal of institutional
resolve. This tends to reduce the likelihood of a “false” signal. See Broome & Krawiec, supra
note 66, at 449.
76. Cf. Christine Korsgaard, The Dependence of Value on Humanity, in RAZ, supra note
26, at 79 (arguing that the values of some things are internal to the very idea of those things).
Notice that this claim that racial diversity is good for its own sake is different from the claim I
rejected earlier that racial diversity has intrinsic value. We might value racial diversity for its
own sake, but that value may be thought to derive entirely from the value of the community
that has it. See KORSGAARD, supra note 21, at 264; Langton, supra note 20, at 163–64.
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all about one’s own good.77 One might make a similar argument that
racial diversity is naturally good for people joined in community.
Racial diversity is something that a community has reason to pursue
for its own sake, because it partly constitutes a certain ideal of human
interaction and society; and so one cannot care about the good of a
community without also caring about that community’s racial
diversity. The argument is not that racial diversity is intrinsically
good, but that it is part of an instantiation of human community to
which we are committed, and so to value the latter is necessarily to
value the former.
I think this argument runs up against some difficulties. For one,
it helps itself to a conception of an ideal community that needs to be
argued for, as I suspect not everyone will find it to be self-evidently
correct. Is it really the case that racial diversity, or diversity of any
other kind for that matter, is necessarily a constitutive aspect of
community? I think there is reason for skepticism here. It would
suggest, for example, that communities within racially homogeneous
societies are somehow deficient qua community, even if the society’s
homogeneity is purely a happenstance of, say, geographical isolation.
It would also suggest that, within the context of a racially diverse
society, interest-based groups that might voluntarily be formed for
the sake of celebrating shared racial identities could not live up to an
ideal of human community. Those conclusions seem to me to
depend on an implausibly narrow notion of what constitutes a good
community. We can agree that racial diversity enhances many kinds
of communities without necessarily having to accept that it is
constitutive of the very ideal of community.
A second non-instrumental approach to understanding the value
of diversity is perhaps a slight variation of the first. Whether or not
racial diversity is constitutive of the good of human community, we
might say, more modestly, that given the fact of a racially diverse
society, valuing racial diversity within the society’s various
institutional domains is constitutive of a commitment to social
equality and justice.78 More specifically, if the broader population of

77. This is not quite the same as claiming that developing one’s own talents has intrinsic
value (if that is taken to mean that it is unconditionally good), because the value of human
flourishing itself depends on there being value in the good of human beings.
78. See Lizzie Barmes & Sue Ashtiany, The Diversity Approach to Achieving Equality:
Potential and Pitfalls, 32 INDUS. L.J. 274, 292 (2003) (noting a basic distinction between
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a society is characterized by a certain racial diversity, and if we are
committed to a conception of equality or justice under which all
segments of society are entitled to the same opportunities with
regard to occupation, civic participation, political life, and residential
community, then we must also regard racial diversity within those
relevant institutional contexts as good, insofar as such diversity is a
necessary concomitant of that sort of equality.79 In other words, if
the realization of certain conditions of justice and fair equality of
opportunity would entail the distribution of various goods, positions,
and offices among all segments of our diverse society, then one could
not regard the realization of those conditions as good without also
seeing racial diversity in the relevant institutional contexts as good
(to the extent that the absence of such diversity would be
inconsistent with the satisfaction of those aforementioned
conditions).80 On this sort of view, the good of racial diversity is a
practical consequence of the good of the realization of certain
conditions of justice, and so valuing racial diversity would simply be
part of what constitutes a commitment to that conception of
justice.81 Racial diversity on such a view is not good in virtue of its
effects or because of its usefulness, but is good insofar as it partly
constitutes the realization of a certain notion of justice and
substantive equality. This is an extrinsic but non-instrumental
account of the value of racial diversity.

“valuing diversity for instrumental . . . reasons and valuing diversity for intrinsic, justice
reasons”).
79. Cf. SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 57 (describing a view of diversity as “a possible, or
even probable consequence of individuals’ autonomous exercise of their wills and rights” and
suggesting that on this sort of view, “the diversity that flows from these exercises of individual
freedom is presumptively valid”).
80. This argument assumes the fact of racial diversity. It would go through neither in
the case of a society that lacked diversity, nor in the case of a society that had such diversity but
for which racial difference lacked social or psychological salience. In the latter sort of society,
racial diversity might be regarded in the same way that we regard, say, diversity of eye color,
and would have no practical bearing on matters of justice or equality. A society in which racial
difference had no actual significance probably would have no reason to worry about
distributional disparities corresponding to race, or at least no more reason than we have to
worry about inequalities corresponding to eye color. I take it as given that our society is one in
which racial difference does have significance as a matter of historical and present fact. For
helpful discussion of this point, see Amy Gutmann, Responding to Racial Injustice, in APPIAH
& GUTMANN, supra note 10, at 163, 163–76; Foster, supra note 166, at 127–38.
81. Cf. SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 57.
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IV. THE IDEAL OF COLORBLINDNESS
So far, I have been discussing ways in which racial diversity might
be regarded as valuable without considering any constraints that
might exist on how a community or other group that lacks it might
go about producing it. One might believe that racial diversity is a
good thing in contexts such as education, employment, and
governance, but not that the value of such diversity is sufficient to
justify every possible way of bringing it about. In other words, it
might be agreed that, other things equal, it is better for certain kinds
of groups to be racially diverse than not, but the “other things” that
must be controlled include limits on the methods employed to
engineer diversity where it would not otherwise exist.
The ideal of colorblindness is, for Chief Justice Roberts, one of
those limits. It is the fly in the racial diversity ointment. We might
(charitably) assume that the Chief Justice agrees that racial diversity
is a condition that could have instrumental or non-instrumental
value in at least some contexts. Even so, he might, without logical
inconsistency, take issue with the further assertion that it is
permissible in those contexts to bring diversity about by methods
that conflict with the constraint of colorblindness.82 What, then, is
the nature of the conflict between the value of racial diversity and a
commitment to the ideal of colorblindness?
A. Eliminativist and Procedural Colorblindness Distinguished
We need to distinguish between two varieties of colorblindness.
One set of arguments for colorblindness amounts to a sort of
promotion of the value of national or social unity.83 The idea here is
that we as a society ought to celebrate and promote that which all of
us have in common—viz., a shared identity as citizens of a single
nation—rather than engage in actions and policies that tend to
validate and preserve the notion that racial differences mark any real
82. This position—that racial diversity is good but that we should not abandon
colorblindness for the sake of producing it—is evidently one that enjoys broad popular
support. See Sam Howe Verhovek, In Poll, Americans Reject Means But Not Ends of Racial
Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997, § 1, at 1, 32 (“[M]ost Americans today endorse the
goal of racial diversity in schools and offices, but reject some of the main methods used so far
to achieve it.”).
83. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 17 (1998);
Lawrence Blum, Ethnicity, Disunity and Equality, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY 193 (Laurence Thomas ed., 2008) (discussing Schlesinger’s argument).
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differences of identity or community. On this sort of eliminativist or
assimilationist84 version of colorblindness, the goal of racial justice
and equality should be to render racial diversity a matter of social
indifference: we should not care about racial diversity at all because,
for the sake of promoting national identity, we should not regard
race as having any socially or politically significant meaning.85
I am not going to address this eliminativist version of
colorblindness, partly because it does not seem to feature
prominently in current debates,86 but more importantly, because the
question that interests me here is the nature of the conflict between
valuing racial diversity and the notion of colorblindness.87 The
eliminativist believes that there is no social value in race, and a
fortiori, no value in racial diversity.88 If one sees no value in racial
diversity in the first place, then of course colorblindness follows
trivially.
The far more interesting version of colorblindness is the one that
allows for the recognition of the value of racial diversity. (At least a
plurality, and probably a majority of the Supreme Court does
believe, after all, that diversity can constitute a compelling state
interest.89) This version of colorblindness does not simply fall out

84. Cf. Gotanda, supra note 12, at 59 (“[Colorblindness implies] a belief that,
ultimately, race should have no real significance, but instead be limited to formal categories of
white and Black, unconnected to any social, economic, or cultural practice.”).
85. Neil Gotanda offers a sharply articulated critique of this eliminativist version of
colorblindness. He argues that it “would require abolishing the distinctiveness that we
attribute to Black community, culture, and consciousness” and therefore constitutes a sort of
“cultural genocide.” Id. at 59–60.
86. See WALTER BENN MICHAELS, THE TROUBLE WITH DIVERSITY: HOW WE
LEARNED TO LOVE IDENTITY AND IGNORE INEQUALITY 5 (2006) (“[O]ur commitment to
diversity has redefined the opposition to discrimination as the appreciation (rather than the
elimination) of difference.”). Walter Benn Michaels’s larger point is that we are in danger of
allowing our commitment to racial diversity to supplant a commitment to economic equality.
Id. at 15–20.
87. That being said, it does not seem entirely implausible to me that the sentiment
behind racial eliminativism might provide motivation to some current proponents of
colorblindness. Justice Thomas might be one such proponent. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 355–57 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (reducing racial diversity to an
“aesthetic”).
88. For an illuminating anecdotal portrayal of this sort of colorblindness, see PATRICIA
J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND FUTURE: THE PARADOX OF RACE 8–9 (1998).
89. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 783–
85 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that “diversity, depending on its meaning
and definition, is a compelling educational goal”); id. at 838 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by
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from a rejection of the value of racial diversity.90 We might call this
view procedural colorblindness. This idea of colorblindness describes
a side constraint on the considerations that may be taken into
account in the differential selection of individuals for a particular
benefit or burden. That constraint is, of course, that the race or color
of individuals not be considered in any such decision-making
process. It does not speak to whether we have reason to regard racial
diversity as a worthwhile goal. The version of colorblindness that
interests me is a procedural constraint that restricts the ways in which
we can attempt to arrive at it.91 In an important theoretical way,
therefore, the value of racial diversity and a commitment to
colorblindness are orthogonal rather than directly opposed.
The true opposing correlative of the procedural ideal of
colorblindness is not racial diversity, then, but rather selecting for
racial diversity by differentiating among individuals on the basis of
their race. (I shall hereinafter use “selecting for diversity” as
shorthand for this longer phrase.) The most obvious reason that
colorblindness and diversity—though theoretically orthogonal—are
practically in conflict is that in the actual circumstances of our
society, meaningful racial diversity can be achieved in certain
contexts only by directly selecting for it.92 Thus, even though a
commitment to colorblindness is not logically inconsistent with
regarding racial diversity as valuable, it can create a practical
impediment to bringing it about.

Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.) (arguing that achieving racial diversity or integration in
schools constitutes a compelling interest). I assume that Justice Sotomayor would also agree.
90. It is true, to be sure, that the notion of colorblindness has come to be identified
with a particular political sensibility that tends to engender skepticism about the value of racial
diversity and actions that are designed to promote it. But it is at least conceptually possible to
value racial diversity while also favoring colorblindness.
91. Cf. Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the
California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1140 (1996)
(characterizing colorblindness as a sort of “pretending”).
92. For example, in the Gratz v. Bollinger litigation, the University of Michigan asserted
in its brief in opposition to certiorari that if it were not permitted to select for diversity, the
number of minority students admitted would “drop precipitously, leaving most of [the
College’s] learning contexts with very few minority students, or none at all.” Respondents’
Brief in Conditional Opposition to Certiorari Before Judgment at 9, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516).
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B. Colorblindness as a Deontological Constraint

The question I will address with regard to colorblindness, just as
I did with regard to racial diversity, is why someone might regard
that procedural ideal as something good, as something that we have
reason to care about. It seems relatively easy to state various reasons
in favor of selecting for diversity and sacrificing colorblindness, given
all that I have said so far. To wit: doing so may be necessary to
achieve a state of affairs to which we attach positive value. We have
reason to select for diversity just because and to the extent that we
have reason to care about the diversity that can thereby be produced.
What sorts of reasons, then, favor the principle of colorblindness?
Why should we care about it? We might begin formulating an answer
by considering how our concern for it falls within the matrix of
intrinsic vs. extrinsic and instrumental vs. non-instrumental value. Is
the constraint of colorblindness intrinsically important? There are
many familiar sorts of circumstances in which the norm of
colorblindness seems to lack relevance. If we were trying to cast the
role of Martin Luther King, Jr., in a dramatic production, it seems
doubtful that we would have any reason to consider using a
colorblind selection procedure. Similarly, if the victim of a crime
states with high confidence that her assailant was a white male, the
colorblindness of a particular investigative technique would not seem
to provide any reason to recommend following it in the context of
that particular case.93 The normative significance or value of
colorblindness is therefore not intrinsic. Arguments in favor of it
must derive from our commitment to other things (which I will
consider below), such as the value of certain predicted consequences,
or a particular conception of equality of treatment implicit in the
constitutional guarantee of Equal Protection.
If colorblindness is extrinsically valuable, is its value purely
instrumental, or is it primarily non-instrumental in character? Let us
take a step back to understand the question. In thinking about the

93. Cf. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111, 118–20 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing
Equal Protection challenge against police investigation of local black students and citizens
based on criminal victim’s description of assailant as a black male with a cut on his hand). But
cf. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769, 785–86 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing persuasively that police might have violated Equal
Protection Clause by conducting sweeping investigation based on racial description given by
victim, to the exclusion of other aspects of description that might have called for narrower
investigation).
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value of colorblindness, our real interest is in understanding the
nature of the constraint, if any, it should place on the procedures we
use in assembling groups of people in certain kinds of institutionally
significant contexts (schools, workplaces, governments, etc.).
According to its proponents, the value of colorblindness is not
merely something that we have reason to see as good, like a healthy
lifestyle or developing our talents. The reasons in favor of the ideal of
colorblindness are supposed to have a more peremptory force. The
principle of colorblindness espoused by Chief Justice Roberts—the
version that is supposed to invalidate procedures that select directly
for diversity—demands compliance and renders impermissible those
actions that violate it. We are to think of it as a source of
deontological reasons.
Deontic
or
deontological
reasons
are
compulsory
considerations—e.g., duties, obligations, entitlements—that have the
normative force of a binding command.94 Proponents of the
principle of colorblindness argue, of course, that the principle derives
its authority from the Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription against
denial of equal protection of the laws.95 The principle is supposed to
provide conclusive reason against using procedures that select
directly for diversity whatever the beneficial consequences of doing
so might be. One cannot respect the principle of colorblindness and
at the same time view it as defeasible whenever the creation of
diversity would necessitate its override. If the principle is taken
seriously, the beneficial consequences of violating it simply do not
count as reasons for doing so,96 except perhaps in extraordinary
cases.97

94. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 175–80 (1986); SCANLON, supra
note 1919, at 81–87; Stephen Darwall, Agent Centered Restrictions From the Inside Out, in
DEONTOLOGY 113–14 (Stephen Darwall ed., 2003). For a wonderfully insightful illustration
of the force of deontological considerations based on a few simple hypothetical cases, see R.
Jay Wallace, The Deontic Structure of Morality 1–25 (online paper), http://philosophy.
berkeley.edu/file/2/Deonticstructure.pdf.
95. One might argue that colorblindness is also required by some fundamental moral
idea of equal treatment or fairness. I raise skeptical questions about this hypothesis below and
have argued elsewhere against it. See Patrick Shin, Compelling Interest, Forbidden Aim: The
Antinomy of Grutter and Gratz, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 431 (2005).
96. See SCANLON, supra note 19, at 84; JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS
39–41 (2d ed. 1990) (proposing the idea of an “exclusionary reason”).
97. For one recent account of how deontological constraints (like rights) might permit
exceptions, see FRANCIS M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS 26–40 (2007).
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This resistance to consequentialist considerations is not unique
to the ideal of colorblindness. The same applies to any deontological
restriction, be it the First Amendment prohibition against the
abridgment of free speech or the general moral prohibition against
promise-breaking. In each case, the rule creates an obligatory duty
that cannot be overridden simply for the sake of beneficial
consequences that would flow from a violation.98 This is so even
when those consequences tend to support the general policies that
justify the restriction in the first place.99 For example, suppose I have
promised to look after your children on Friday night so that you can
go out with your spouse, and then another friend asks me at the last
minute to look after her children on that same evening so that she
can keep promises she made to five friends to take them to dinner.
The fact that I could prevent five promises from being broken by
breaking my single promise to you does not provide sufficient reason
for me to do so; you are entitled to hold me to my promise, even
though my breaking it would result in a greater number of promises
being kept overall.100 The constitutional constraints of the First
Amendment have a similar deontological structure.101 The state
could not justify suppressing otherwise protected speech—e.g., a
book arguing that publicly expressing one’s ideas is bad—simply by
proving that such suppression would result in a net increase in the
number of people taking part in the public exchange of ideas.102 The

98. Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28–33 (1974) (explaining the
idea of “side constraints”).
99. See NAGEL, supra note 94, at 178–79; NOZICK, supra note 98, at 30; SCANLON,
supra note 199, at 82–83.
100. This aspect of deontological obligation is sometimes called the “paradox of
deontology.” See Christopher McMahon, The Paradox of Deontology, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
350 (1991); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, Introduction to CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 8–9
(Samuel Scheffler ed., 1998).
101. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (invalidating
content-based hate crime statute under First Amendment, even though statute served
compelling state interest in protecting basic human rights).
102. I do not mean to suggest that all deontological restrictions have an identical
structure. In the constitutional context, at least, they do not. The First Amendment
prohibition on abridgments of free speech is different, for example, from the Fourth
Amendment restriction on searches and seizures in terms of the kind of justification that would
permit an exception. Even those who would oppose an absolutist version of constitutional
colorblindness might support a version of the rule encompassing a more flexible framework of
exceptions. See Gotanda, supra note 12, at 66–67 (arguing against colorblindness but in favor
of a constitutional restriction on the use of racial classification modeled on the religion
clauses). That sort of rule would still entail a deontological restriction insofar as it remained a
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point is that insofar as colorblindness is a deontological restriction,
the same kinds of observations apply. For the proponent of
colorblindness, the positive benefits of racial diversity simply do not
register as reasons that could be sufficient to justify selecting directly
for diversity.103 And this is true even if those positive benefits would
promote the basic policies that underlie the ideal of colorblindness in
the first place.
The real question, then, is why the principle of colorblindness
should be understood in this way, as a deontological restriction that
invalidates procedures that select for diversity, even when those
procedures would yield consequences (viz., racial diversity) that
everyone has reason to value. So let us now consider both the
instrumental and non-instrumental reasons that might be thought to
justify the principle of colorblindness.
C. Instrumentalist Considerations
The instrumentalist or consequentialist104 defense of
colorblindness appeals to the value of the good consequences that
we could expect to flow from adhering to a strict policy of
colorblindness. Assuming a common goal of eradicating racial
discrimination and improving the situation of traditionally
disadvantaged minorities, a proponent of colorblindness might take
the view that strict adherence to that procedural constraint is simply
the most effective means of achieving those goals. This is one way of
interpreting Chief Justice Roberts’ enigmatic claim in Parents
Involved that the “way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is

peremptory constraint that resisted override on the basis of simple, ad hoc consequentialist
balancing.
103. The proponent does not necessarily believe that the principle of colorblindness must
be held exceptionless. A deontological obligation can admit exceptions while retaining its
deontological character, provided that the exceptions are structurally limited to a narrow range
of application. See, e.g., KAMM, supra note 97. For example, even the proponent of
colorblindness would allow exceptions for policies that pass “strict scrutiny”—i.e., policies that
are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest; and even the prohibition on
intentional killing can give way to certain justified violations, such as self-defense. The larger
question of the possibility and nature of exceptions to deontological restrictions is beyond my
scope here.
104. In the usual language of moral theory, arguments in favor or against a particular
action based on instrumental considerations relating to the action’s consequences are called
“consequentialist.”
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to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”105 The reference to
“discriminating on the basis of race” is tendentious in its
characterization of the race-conscious selection measures used by the
school districts (what I prefer to call “selecting for diversity”), but
Roberts’ claim can be understood as an assertion that choosing
adherence to colorblind procedures over race-conscious methods of
selecting for diversity will, in the long run, tend to have the
consequence of reducing the overall occurrence of race
discrimination106—even if it might seem obstructive or even
counterproductive in particular cases.
The main difficulty with this way of understanding the basis of
the commitment to colorblindness—even putting aside any
disagreement one might have with the claim on its merits107—is that
it effectively makes the requirement of colorblindness dependent
upon a rather controversial prediction of its social effects.108 It seems
to me implausible that such a speculative empirical hypothesis should
be thought to be built into the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee
of Equal Protection. Furthermore, the notion that the principle of
colorblindness should be followed because of its expected
consequences seems susceptible to the very same objection that
Chief Justice Roberts levies against race-conscious methods of
selecting directly for diversity. Supporters of non-colorblind
procedures also argue, after all, that reduction of race discrimination
is among the expected beneficial effects of such measures.109 In his

105. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007).
106. For an interesting argument to the contrary—i.e., that the production of racial
diversity might be useful as a means of promoting attitudes of colorblindness, see Carbado &
Gulati, supra note 9, at 1157–58.
107. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Fifty years of
experience since Brown v. Board of Education should teach us that the problem before us defies
so easy a solution.” (citation omitted)).
108. Another difficulty with the claim is that it characterizes too narrowly the argument
in favor of selecting for diversity: the goal of creating racial diversity is not just to “stop
discrimination” but also, arguably, to create conditions of substantive economic equality and
fair equality of opportunity. It is not clear why adhering to a colorblind ideal should be
thought to serve those goals.
109. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 843–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Some would go
further to argue that colorblindness would operate to preserve certain forms of racial bias. See
Elizabeth Anderson, The Future of Racial Integration, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 83, at 241 (“Once we acknowledge that mental states reside
at various levels of consciousness, the call for conscious color-blindness effectively amounts to a
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response to Justice Breyer’s call to recognize those benefits, Chief
Justice Roberts accuses Justice Breyer of making an invalid argument
that “[t]he end justifies the means.”110 If social benefits do not
constitute an end sufficient to justify the means of selecting for
diversity, then it would seem self-contradictory to defend the value
of the principle of colorblindness in terms of the same kind of
beneficial effects.111 If the value of adhering to the deontological
restriction of colorblindness is based purely on its social benefits,
then the adherent’s charge of arguing from ends to means becomes
self-defeating. Thus, if Chief Justice Roberts’ assertion that the “way
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race”112 is understood as a claim that colorblindness is
supported by consequentialist, instrumentalist considerations, then it
is not only enigmatic, but hypocritical.
D. Non-Instrumentalist Considerations: Justice Harlan’s Argument
However, the proponent of colorblindness, pace Chief Justice
Roberts, need not insist that its value lies in its expected beneficial
consequences. One non-consequentialist argument is that basic
principles of fairness and formal equality of treatment require
colorblindness. I am not going to discuss the merits of that familiar
argument here, except to note that its success ultimately boils down
to the premise that an individual’s race is never by itself a relevant
reason for including or excluding him from certain kinds of
groups.113 Here, however, I am starting from the assumption that
racial diversity is something we have reason to value. Thus, we have
already rejected the premise presupposed by the formal equality
argument: we cannot believe that racial diversity is good without also
believing that race can be relevant in our judgments about who
should populate social groups. In other words, if we assume that
call to let unconscious racial biases operate unopposed by conscious policies that might change
them.”).
110. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 743 (Roberts, C.J.).
111. It might be argued that colorblindness is simply more effective at eliminating
discrimination than selecting for diversity, but I do not think the Court could have been
resting its constitutional conclusions on that baldly empirical claim.
112. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748.
113. I have elaborated this point elsewhere. See Shin, supra note 95. The basic idea is that
it is logically inconsistent to hold at the same time that race can be a relevant reason in
selection decisions and that it always constitutes formal inequality of treatment to treat people
differently on account of their race.
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racial diversity has value, then we have already decided that racial
difference can be a consideration that provides justificatory reasons
for certain actions or attitudes.114 I do not mean to assert that it
necessarily follows that differential treatment based on race is
justified for the sake of creating diversity. The point is that such
differential treatment might be justified, and so colorblindness
cannot be regarded as simply falling out of a commitment to equal
treatment.115 Of course, some proponents of colorblindness might in
fact believe that race is always irrelevant and that racial diversity has
no value, but my interest here, again, is in the argument for
colorblindness (against selecting for diversity) that does not depend
upon a prior rejection of the value of racial diversity.
The non-instrumentalist argument supporting the value of
colorblindness that I do want to explore is the one originally
articulated by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.116
This argument invokes the fundamental, non-instrumental norm of
equal respect. According to this argument, the value of
colorblindness is that it represents a way of realizing that norm. Here
is the familiar passage from Harlan’s opinion:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth
and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if
it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles
of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye
of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling
class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The
humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as
man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when

114. This is just part of what it means, in my view, for something to be valuable. See
supra note 19.
115. Peter Schuck observes that one practical and legal problem created by the fact of
diversity is that in order for a society to conform its policies to basic principles of “equal
treatment, dignity, and respect,” it “must first decide which groups are similar enough that
they must be treated the same, and which are sufficiently different that they fall into different
categories justifying disparate treatment.” SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 60. The implication here
is that, as I also suggest, disparate treatment of members of certain different groups might not
be inconsistent with a commitment to principles of “equal treatment, dignity, and respect.”
116. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are
involved.117

I quote at length to make clear that, for Harlan, colorblindness
represents a constitutional commitment to ignore the actual
superiority and dominance of the “white race.” Colorblindness is
after all, a defect of vision consisting in an inability to discern certain
differences that really do exist.118 Harlan’s interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment thus embodies a strange sort of aspirational
commitment. His claim is that it should be read to contain a selfimposed blindness to the actual differences among the races as a way
of realizing the racial anti-subordination principle he sees embedded
in the Equal Protection Clause. Constitutional colorblindness
expresses equal respect for the legal rights and status of individuals
who, by virtue of their race, might otherwise be regarded as inferior
or less deserving of legal protection.119
This second justification for the principle of colorblindness is
non-consequentialist and non-instrumentalist in that it does not
depend on the value of further effects that adherence might be
expected to produce. Generally stated, the argument is that we
should commit ourselves to the ideal of colorblindness because it
expresses a moral and constitutional truth, namely, that all individuals
are entitled, regardless of their race, to equal respect under the
laws.120 On this rationale, we adhere to colorblind procedures not
primarily because this is a way to achieve some desired social result,
but because in doing so, we affirm our commitment to a
fundamental principle of equality.121
117. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
118. That Justice Harlan believed that there were real differences between the races is
reinforced by his infamous remarks later in his dissent: “There is a race so different from our
own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. . . . I
allude to the Chinese race.” Id. at 561.
119. Cf. Siegel, supra note 12, at 127 (arguing that the rhetoric of formal colorblindness
“can be understood, historically and contextually, as repudiating the relevance claims of statusrace talk,” i.e., ascriptions of differential social status according to race).
120. For an account of the notion of expressive action generally and of the expressive
concerns embodied in the Equal Protection Clause in particular, see Elizabeth Anderson &
Richard Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503,
1533–45 (2000).
121. One might ask why expressing a value through adherence to a principle should not
be considered analogous to engaging in a particular action for the instrumental purpose of
sending a signal. The difference is that in sending a signal, one acts for the sake of a particular
communicative consequence, whereas in acting to express commitment to a particular norm,
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These are powerful ideas and cannot lightly be dismissed. Their
implications for how we should think about race-conscious methods
for creating diversity in the context of contemporary controversies,
however, depend upon the extent to which we can still say, as Justice
Harlan suggested in the context of his day, that colorblindness
expresses a principle of equal respect. That is not a proposition on
which everyone will agree, but one can say at least this much: the
rejection of colorblindness signified something far different in the
context of Plessy than it signifies in the context of cases like Parents
Involved. Harlan was surely justified in suggesting that principles
permitting race-based classifications in his time were largely
expressions of white supremacy and privilege.122 In that society, there
was no concept of using racial preference as a means of reducing
inequality; so for the state to legitimize race conscious action was
tantamount to condoning existing structures of racial subordination.
By contrast, in today’s society no one thinks that the sort of raceconscious differential treatment at issue in Parents Involved entails
expressing approval for any such practice. We might disagree about
whether selecting directly for racial diversity is, all things considered,
a good thing; but the alternative to a commitment to colorblindness
for us is not, as it might have been in the eyes of Justice Harlan,
endorsement of a principle or practice of racial subordination.
For Justice Harlan, a commitment to colorblindness constituted
a necessary and uniquely powerful expression of the repudiation of
official policies of racial subordination.123 What I am claiming is that
colorblindness no longer has that sort of expressive value. I do not
think anyone could plausibly maintain in the context of our current
circumstances that adherence to the principle of colorblindness is a
unique expression of the repudiation of practices of racial
subordination.124 To the contrary, I believe adherence to

the action is not done for the sake of communicating that commitment (although it might of
course have that effect). Rather, in order for an action to express a norm, the norm itself must
be regarded as a reason for the action. Signaling is an empirical effect of action, whereas the
expressive content of an action is given by a relation between the action and the norms that are
regarded as guiding it.
122. See Gotanda, supra note 12, at 39.
123. Cf. Siegel, supra note 12, at 127.
124. Yet, in his concurrence in Adarand, Justice Thomas declared, “I believe that there is
a moral and constitutional equivalence . . . between laws designed to subjugate a race and
those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of
equality.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
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colorblindness has come to be identified with a certain sort of
fairness or formal equality objection to policies of race-based
preference (which I briefly mentioned and set aside at the beginning
of this section).125 Policies that promote racial diversity seem more
aligned with ideals of substantive equality of citizenship126 and the
elimination of racial stratification.127 Some would even argue that a
commitment to colorblindness signifies views that are themselves
objectionable.128 In any case, the value of colorblindness can no
longer be identified—and certainly not uniquely identified—with the
fundamental norm of equal respect of which it might historically
have been an expression.
What, then, are we left with? The consequentialist arguments for
colorblindness seem insufficient to justify adherence to it as a
deontological constraint. If we start with the supposition that racial
diversity is something we have reason to care about (for any of the
reasons discussed earlier), the argument that colorblindness is
required as a matter of formal equality also becomes ineffectual. The
most powerful defense of the principle of colorblindness might have
been the argument that adherence to that norm constitutes an
expression of the substantive principle of equal respect and antisubordination embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment, but that
concurring) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). That remark does seem
to suggest that relaxing the constraint of colorblindness is morally tantamount to racial
subjugation. A few paragraphs later in the opinion, however, Justice Thomas spells out what
seems to be his real concern: that race-conscious procedures have a “destructive impact on the
individual and our society” because they “may cause [minorities] to develop dependencies or
to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.” Id. at 240–41. This concern might
support a consequentialist argument against race-conscious procedures, but it hardly proves a
moral “equivalence” between abandoning colorblindness and policies of racial subjugation.
125. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
126. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (O’Connor, J.); Kenneth L.
Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 72–73
(2004) (arguing that Grutter’s diversity rationale is based on an ideal of equal citizenship);
Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term – Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59–62 (2003) (discussing various broadly
democratic values implicit in Grutter’s diversity rationale).
127. See Anderson, supra note 109, at 241; Siegel, supra note 12, at 143–48 (arguing
that colorblindness discourse, historically identified with a commitment to nondiscrimination
and equality, has become an impediment to the elimination of racial stratification).
128. One might argue, for example, that in today’s society, colorblindness does not
express a principle of equal respect but rather expresses disregard for the problems of racial
inequality that persist. Cf. Gotanda, supra note 12, at 62–63 (“[M]odern color-blind
constitutionalism supports the supremacy of white interests and must therefore be regarded as
racist.”).
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argument has become anachronistic and obsolete. The deontological
conception of colorblindness, for all of its basic intuitive appeal,
seems to elude any ready justification.
E. The “Racial Chits” Objection to Selecting for Diversity
Perhaps there is another avenue to explore. The final argument
for the value of colorblindness that I shall consider is suggested by
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved. Although Justice
Kennedy explicitly distances himself from Chief Justice Roberts’
absolute commitment to an ideal of colorblindness,129 he voices
concerns about selecting directly for diversity that I think must be
taken seriously. These concerns can be viewed as an indirect
argument for moving in the direction of colorblindness based on a
certain negative value attaching to the act of selecting directly for
racial diversity.
While taking the position that some consideration of race may be
permitted for the sake of creating diversity in educational contexts,130
Justice Kennedy asserts that “[r]eduction of an individual to an
assigned racial identity for differential treatment is among the most
pernicious actions our government can undertake.”131 He suggests
that it would be constitutionally intolerable for a school district to
manufacture racially diverse student bodies by making assignment
determinations based solely on race: “Crude measures of this sort
threaten to reduce children to racial chits valued and traded
according to one school’s supply and another’s demand.”132
Justice Kennedy’s remarks are, in an important and perhaps
surprising way, closely related to Justice Harlan’s argument for
colorblindness. Justice Harlan advocated for colorblindness as a
positive expression of a principle of equal respect embedded in the
Equal Protection Clause. Justice Kennedy argues against “crude”
methods of selecting for racial diversity because they express an
attitude that violates that principle of equal respect. For Justice
Kennedy, the problem with such methods is not that they express a
judgment of the superiority of one race over another (which was

129. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787–
88 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130. See id. at 797–98.
131. Id. at 795.
132. Id. at 798.
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Harlan’s concern in Plessy), but that they express an attitude that
treats individuals as nothing more than countable “chits,” items to
be accumulated or exchanged as necessary in order to balance
accounts. These methods are objectionable because they evince a
failure of respect, a failure to treat people as individuals capable of
rational choice and to whom we are morally answerable.133 Whereas
for Harlan, the value of colorblindness consists in the attitude it
expresses, for Kennedy, the value of colorblindness (or at least some
measure of it) is a function of the disvalue of the attitude expressed
by crude methods of selecting for diversity. But their positions are
related in their concern for the non-instrumental, expressive value or
disvalue of the constitutional principles to which we choose to
commit ourselves.
There are at least two possible responses to Justice Kennedy’s
line of argument, the “racial chits” objection. One response is on the
facile side: although it may be true that certain “crude” methods of
selecting for diversity express a failure of respect for individuals, this
is not strictly speaking a problem of equality, so long as the method
in question reduces everyone to a “racial chit.” In other words, even
if the “crude” methods that Justice Kennedy has in mind are
objectionable in virtue of expressing a lack of respect for individuals,
this is of no particular concern for the Equal Protection Clause,
insofar as that constitutional command is violated only by actions
that evince unequal respect for some classes of individuals compared
to others. Thus, one might agree that the “racial chits” objection is
well taken but be skeptical whether the objection is properly
associated with considerations having to do with equality.
The more important response, however, requires acknowledging
that certain “crude” methods for creating diversity might indeed be
objectionable because of what they express about the status of the
individuals who will be affected. This seems to me an important
insight. But I do not think it follows that a commitment to
constitutional values of equal respect requires that such methods,
“crude” or not, always be rejected. The racial chits objection seems
to assume that procedures that crudely select for racial diversity are at
best instrumentally valuable as a means of producing racial diversity
(a valuable state of affairs), but that they always express an attitude

133. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (discussing the
implications of equal respect and concern for the permissibility of affirmative action).
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that is inconsistent with our constitutional commitment to treating
all individuals with equal respect. Thus, on this view, since our
(deontological) constitutional commitment trumps the instrumental
value of selecting for diversity, those selection methods are
impermissible.
What the racial chits objection seems to overlook is the
contingent character of the expressive content of our actions.134 Just
as we saw in the case of colorblindness, adherence to a particular
principle of action may signify one thing under one set of
circumstances and something different under another. Measures that
reduce an individual’s status to a racial category are surely demeaning
and offensive when they are implemented in the service of a social
order that seeks to preserve structures of racial hierarchy and
stratification. But do they necessarily have that same character when
in the service of a collective effort to prevent or rectify such hierarchy
and stratification? What if those problems of inequality have been
persistent and intractable? And what if “crude” methods of
managing racial integration have offered the best hope for progress
in alleviating those problems? Given the right conditions, a
community’s implementation of procedures that aim directly at racial
integration and diversity might, I would think, express a
commitment to the substantive equality of all of its members. This is
not “expression” in a merely symbolic sense, but rather in a
constitutive sense. By adopting procedures that select directly for
racial diversity in institutionally significant settings, a community that
is plagued with problems of racial inequality and stratification can
perhaps constitute itself as a community that cares about the equal
status of its members. In the right context, in other words, perhaps
adopting measures that select directly for diversity just is what it
takes for a community to treat its members with equal respect and
concern.135 If that is the case, then contrary to the racial chits

134. Cf. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 120.
135. Does this constitutive expressive relation between selecting for diversity and a
commitment to equality depend on the actual efficacy of those selection methods in creating
the envisioned equality? On the one hand, I think that to some extent, a community’s decision
to select directly for diversity can express a commitment to equality whether or not the
selection methods actually succeed in bringing about equality. Thus, I think that selecting for
diversity can express a commitment to equality even if it is empirically uncertain whether the
measures in question will turn out to be effective in the long run. But on the other hand, it
seems to me we must say that the expressive value of selecting for diversity must to some extent
be derivative of the value of the diversity that is actually produced. To take the extreme case, if
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objection, a commitment to the creation of diversity without
procedural indirection might be seen as a realization of the values
embedded in the Equal Protection Clause, rather than trumped by
it.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
My goal has been to understand the nature of the value of racial
diversity, the value of adhering to an ideal of colorblindness, and
how those values come into opposition. I have mapped out what I
view as the main categories of arguments. I conclude with a few
observations about the implications of occupying the various value
positions I have staked out.
First, although I have considered each argument for the value of
diversity and colorblindness on its independent merits, it is of course
possible to hold that racial diversity or colorblindness is worth caring
about for a variety of reasons that span the various categories I have
delineated. This simple point can have important implications. For
example, insofar as we regard racial diversity in particular contexts as
having both instrumental and non-instrumental value, we should be
careful not to overemphasize the significance of ongoing empirical
findings regarding whether or not cultivating racial diversity is useful
for producing certain kinds of beneficial effects. In other words, if we
do place at least some non-instrumental value on racial diversity,
then negative empirical findings on the effects of diversity should not
be seen as necessarily fatal to the project of promoting it.
Second, I think that the way that racial diversity is valued in
some contexts may paradoxically undercut arguments for aiming
directly at it in others. For example, I described an “evidential” view
of the value of diversity, according to which racial diversity is good
for a community in the same sense a wet nose is good for a dog: it is
a sign of healthy functioning. Or, racial diversity might be regarded
as an indicator that a community is committed to a certain ethos of
equality or vision of justice. But if this is the best way to think about
the good of racial diversity, then aiming at racial diversity for the
sake of equality or justice might seem to take on a peculiar character,
perhaps akin to splashing water on a dog’s dry nose for the sake of its

it became inarguably clear that racial diversity itself had no effect on redressing problems of
racial inequality in a society, then I would think that a commitment to selecting for diversity
could no longer succeed in expressing a commitment to equality.
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health, i.e., treating the manifestation rather than the root cause of
racial inequality or injustice. This seems to me an important worry,
but not a conclusive argument against selecting for diversity and
adopting a policy of colorblindness. Creating diversity is generally
not easy. In the contexts where we care about it most, adopting the
goal of racial diversity is itself a significant commitment, and then
actually achieving it requires deep institutional resolve. Thus, it
seems hard to imagine that a non-diverse community could make
itself racially diverse in a way that failed to touch whatever had been
the root cause of its former lack of diversity. Putting it another way,
I think it is plausible that the very institutional changes required to
produce racial diversity may also work to alleviate the root sources of
inequalities that would explain its absence. If that is true, then even if
the value of diversity is regarded as primarily evidential, there might
be no illogic in aiming at it as a surrogate for the conditions of
equality and justice that we really have reason to care about.
Third, I have asserted that the value of racial diversity is in
important respects orthogonal to the procedural ideal of
colorblindness, and that the real conflict is between a commitment
to colorblindness and adopting procedures that involve selecting for
diversity. But if the positive value of racial diversity and selecting for
it stand in need of affirmative argument, then so should the value of
colorblindness. One cannot simply invoke the ideal of colorblindness
as a self-evident truth. Indeed, I have suggested that if one begins
with the premise that racial diversity does indeed have positive value
(based on any or all of the arguments articulated in the first part of
this Article), it becomes rather difficult to articulate a robust
argument in favor of strict adherence to the constraint of
colorblindness, at least as a matter of equal treatment. (This is
because colorblindness as a principle of equal treatment presupposes
that race is always an irrelevant difference; but if we attach a positive
value to racial diversity, it follows that race in some sense does matter,
which undercuts the required presupposition.)
Finally, I have tried to show that in the debate about the
commitment to colorblindness versus the adoption of procedures
that select for diversity, a large part of the controversy may have to
do with conflicting notions about the normative commitments that
particular actions may properly be regarded to express. Proponents of
colorblindness tend to argue that a commitment to that ideal is a
direct expression or realization of the fundamental principle of equal
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respect contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. I have asserted
that the original power of the argument for colorblindness consisted
in its being a unique expression of the repudiation of
institutionalized white supremacy and of policies of racial
subordination. In today’s circumstances, however, a commitment to
colorblindness does not have that same expressive value. Indeed, if
living up to the ideals of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
committing ourselves to making actual progress toward equal
citizenship and the elimination of racial stratification, direct methods
of selecting for racial diversity and producing integrated
communities are arguably a more faithful expression and realization
of the basic principles of equal respect and concern embodied in the
guarantee of Equal Protection.
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